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ABSTRACT
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON
INFLATION TARGETING FRAMEWORK
YAG˘CIBAS¸I, O¨zge Filiz
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Erinc¸ Yeldan
July 2012
Aside from its devastating effects on global economy, global financial crisis has also
shaken the mainstream economic theory. After the crisis, policies implemented by gov-
ernments and Central Banks, issues of financial stability, impacts of international capital
flows and exchange rates have become the center of macroeconomic research. This the-
sis examines the impact of global financial crisis on the IT framework. The aim is to
discuss the imperfections and defections in the framework and propose extensions. In
this context, a small open economy DSGE model, calibrated for Turkey during 2003-
2012 is proposed. The base model is extended to capture dynamics of Turkish economy
better. Since, trade and credit channels of transmission mechanism of crisis are the most
powerful channels for the contagion of the crisis to Turkish economy, inclusion of net
international investment position (to the problems of households and entrepreneurs) and
imported capital good (to the production function) strengthen the explanatory power of
the model considerably. Moreover, to address whether allowing Central Bank to respond
exchange rates yields gains in terms of output and inflation stabilization, an augmented
Taylor rule which incorporates exchange rates is constructed. Responses under the
iii
benchmark model where Central Bank uses a traditional Taylor rule and an augmented
Taylor rule are obtained. To provide a reference in interpreting the findings of the model,
a Vector Auto Regression analysis is performed with interest rates, inflation, output level
and exchange rates as endogenous variables. Finally, results of the model experiments
and VAR are compared. The results indicate that, the model with the augmented Taylor
rule can help to smooth business cycle fluctuations more effectively than conventional
Taylor rule but, in some cases, Central Bank may encounter with a tradeoff between
output gap and inflation.
Keywords: Global Financial Crisis, Inflation Targeting, Taylor Rule, International Cap-
ital Flows, Exchange Rates
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O¨ZET
KU¨RESEL FI˙NANSAL KRI˙ZI˙N ENFLASYON
HEDEFLEME REJI˙MI˙ U¨ZERI˙NE ETKI˙LERI˙
YAG˘CIBAS¸I, O¨zge Filiz
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Dr. Erinc¸ Yeldan
Temmuz 2012
Ku¨resel finansal krizin yıkıcı etkisi sadece ku¨resel ekonomiler u¨zerinde olmamıs¸tır.
Aynı zamanda, hakim ekonomik anlayıs¸ da temellerinden sarsılmıs¸tır. Krizden sonra
hu¨ku¨metler ve Merkez Bankaları tarafından uygulanan politikalar eles¸tiri oklarının hedefi
haline gelmis¸; makro ekonomik aras¸tırmalar, finansal istikrar, uluslararası sermaye hareket-
leri ve do¨viz kuru oynaklıklarının etkileri u¨zerinde yog˘unlas¸mıs¸tır. Bu tezde, ku¨resel
ekonomik krizin enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimi u¨zerindeki etkileri incelenmektedir. Amac¸,
enflasyon hedefleme rejiminin eksikliklerini tartıs¸mak ve rejimi gelis¸tirme o¨nerileri sun-
maktır. Bu c¸erc¸evede, 2003-2012 yılları arası Tu¨rkiye ekonomisi ic¸in kalibre edilmis¸
bir ku¨c¸u¨k ac¸ık ekonomi Dinamik Stokastik Genel Denge modeli kurulmus¸tur. Baz
alınan modele, Tu¨rkiye ekonomisi dinamiklerini daha iyi yansıtması ic¸in, uluslararası
net yatırım pozisyonu (hane halkı ve giris¸imcinin optimizasyon problemlerine) ve dıs¸
sermaye malı ithalatı (u¨retim fonksiyonuna) eklenmis¸tir. Krizin Tu¨rkiye ekonomisine
yayılma su¨recinde en etkili kanalların dıs¸ ticaret ve kredi kanalları oldug˘u saptandıg˘ından,
yapılan eklemelerin, modelin ac¸ıklayıcı gu¨cu¨nu¨ bu¨yu¨k o¨lc¸u¨de arttırdıg˘ı go¨zlenmis¸tir.
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Buna ek olarak, Merkez Bankasının do¨viz kuru hareketlerine de kars¸ılık vermesi du-
rumunda u¨retim ve enflasyon stabilizasyonunda fayda sag˘lanıp sag˘lanmayacag˘ını in-
celemek amacıyla, do¨viz kurlarının da dahil edildig˘i bir genis¸letilmis¸ Taylor kuralı
kurulmus¸tur. Merkez Bankasının geleneksel Taylor kuralı ve genis¸letilmis¸ Taylor ku-
ralı kullandıg˘ı durumlarda enflasyon, para politikası, do¨viz kuru ve verimlilik s¸oklarına
go¨sterdig˘i tepki fonksiyonları elde edilmis¸tir. Daha sonra, model tepkilerinin yorumlan-
masında bir referans olus¸turması ic¸in enflasyon, faiz oranı, GSYH ve do¨viz kurunun en-
dojen deg˘is¸ken olarak kullanıldıg˘ı bir Vekto¨r Otoregresif analizi yapılmıs¸tır. Son olarak,
model bulguları ve Vekto¨r Otoregresif bulguları kars¸ılas¸tırılmıs¸ ve genis¸letilmis¸ Taylor
kuralının is¸ do¨ngu¨su¨ dalgalanmalarını, geleneksel Taylor kuralına nazaran yumus¸attıg˘ı,
fakat bazı durumlarda Merkez Bankasını enflasyon ve c¸ıktı ac¸ıg˘ı arasında bir tercih yap-
maya ittig˘i bulunmus¸tur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ku¨resel Finansal Kriz, Enflasyon Hedeflemesi, Taylor Kuralı, Ulus-
lararası Sermaye Akımları, Do¨viz Kurları
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The subprime crisis that began in 2007 has been called the worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression. In addition to its devastating effects on US economy,
crisis rapidly spread around the world and provoked other crises such as Euro zone
debt crisis. By 2012, its impact on global economy has not been ceased yet. But,
another important feature of this crisis is its impact on the mainstream economic
theory. After the crisis, once glorified and praised policies/concepts became obsolete
and discussions for new policies accelerated.
After the crisis, policies implemented by governments and central banks became
the focus of attention. One of the most heavily criticized frameworks is the inflation
targeting (IT) regime. Central Banks blamed for being blinded at the formation of
the crisis. Mortgage crisis began with the burst of the housing price bubble and FED
has not responded to the development of this asset price bubble. Although, it is hard
to detect and respond to asset price bubbles, the fact that one bubble replacing the
other in the US economy indicates there is a structural disorder in the system which
requires attention. Excessive leverages due to the poor monitoring and regulation of
the financial sector was another criticism which allowed building up of vulnerabili-
ties for financial crisis.
However, creating the preconditions for the crisis is not the only issue. Central
Banks of developed countries also criticized for implementing inaccurate strategies
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during the crisis. Policy of lowering interest rates and injecting liquidity did nothing
more than ballooning the asset prices further and easing the credit conditions. In
the end, rather than curing, these policies contribute to the worsening of the global
economy.
In this context, after this crisis, the belief that as long as the inflation is low and
growth is strong, lowering interest rates for stimulating the economy is sufficient de-
molished. Financial stability became a focal point in policy conduction. Especially,
many developed countries declared the financial stability as one of their primary
objectives.
European banks had a huge stock of the toxic mortgage based securities as assets
and when house prices collapsed, most of these assets became worthless. Worsening
of the financial system triggered the debt crisis at Europe. So, contagion of financial
crisis to developed countries occurred mostly via financial sector.
Owing to their past financial crisis experiences, developing countriesmonitoring
and controlling mechanism were more developed and also, they were lack of deep
mortgage markets. Hence, although they inevitably affected from the crisis via finan-
cial channel, the effect was very limited compared to developed countries. The im-
pacts of the crisis felt via changes in the international capital flows, exchange rates,
and contraction in the external demand. For developing countries, which finance
their growth with capital inflows; decline of the capital inflows trigger domestic cri-
sis. Given the volatility of international capital flows, emerging economies became
more and more fragile to risk appetite of financial players. Furthermore, with inten-
sive capital flows and associated appreciation in the currency, credit expansions may
occur and asset bubbles may form.
As a typical developing country, Turkey had a strong supervision mechanism
due to its past crisis experience. Financial sector strength indicators remained to be
strong during crisis. Deficit in current accounts and dependence on capital inflows
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were a few of the main fragilities. Also contraction in the external demand deterio-
rates trade balance. Hence, we can say that transmission of the global financial crisis
to Turkish economy was mostly due to trade and credit channels.
A conventional IT does not respond to shocks to financial stability, international
capital flows and exchange rates until their effect become apparent on output and
prices. Threats associated with these issues were already present but came to sur-
face after the financial crisis and required an immediate revision in the scope of the
monetary policy. Considering its widespread use and threats of the philosophy of
concentrating on a single objective, and throw all other elements background out of
focus, call for special attention.
This thesis examines the impact of global financial crisis on the IT framework.
The aim is to discuss the imperfections and defections in the framework and propose
extensions. It is agreed that financial stability is indispensable for the macroeco-
nomic stability. However, there is not one common recipe for sustaining financial
stability since indicators of it alters from country to country. For instance, asset
prices are a crucial indicator for the health of financial strength for US, where it is
not very important for Turkish economy. For Turkey, main fragilities are divergence
between external and domestic demand, deficit in current account and imbalance
in external financing composition. Furthermore, for developing countries, financial
channel too may work through international capital flows and exchange rates. Hence,
in this thesis, these concepts will be particularly emphasized.
To answer the question whether responding to exchange rates makes a differ-
ence in dampening the business cycle fluctuations; a small open economy DSGE
model is constructed. First contribution of this thesis is the proposition of a model
that represents post- global financial crisis. Incorporation of net international invest-
ment position to the problems of households and entrepreneurs allows us to observe
the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on model dynamics. Secondly, addition of
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imported capital goods to the production function of the entrepreneur enriches the
model by incorporating trade channel. Finally, it is found that an augmented Taylor
rule with exchange rates helps to smooth business cycle fluctuations while it may
lead to tradeoffs between output gap and inflation.
Outline of the paper will be as follows: In chapter two, an overview of IT will be
made with an emphasis on the strengths and weaknesses of the framework. The role
of exchange rates and international capital flows will be examined in a subsection
since, they are the key variables in our quantitative and theoretical analyses and they
are also important concepts in the macroeconomic balances of developing countries.
In Chapter 3, formation, causes and consequences of the global financial crisis
will be discussed. This chapter is important in the sense that, it shows the weaknesses
of the IT framework in practice and highlights the parts that need to be cured imme-
diately. Impacts of the global financial crisis on Turkish economy will be discussed
in a subsection to clarify the motivations for the extensions of the model.
In the fourth chapter, a small open economy DSGE model, calibrated for Turk-
ish economy during 2003-2012 is proposed. The base model, which investigates the
relationship between asset prices, borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the
business cycle for US economy, is extended to capture dynamics of Turkish econ-
omy better. Since, trade and credit channels of transmission mechanism of crisis are
the most powerful channels for the contagion of the crisis to Turkish economy, net
international investment position (to the problems of households and entrepreneurs)
and imported capital good (to the production function) are included to the model.
With these additions, effects of exchange rate fluctuations and changes in interna-
tional capital flows are captured. Hence, explanatory power of the model improved
considerably. Moreover, to address whether allowing Central Bank to respond ex-
change rates yields gains in terms of output and inflation stabilization, an augmented
Taylor rule, which incorporates exchange rates is constructed.
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In Chapter 5, motivation and methodology of the VAR analysis which con-
structed with interest rates, exchange rates, output and inflation is reported. The
aim of this analysis is to provide a quantitative reference for the model experiments
i.e. to the test the success of the models fitting to Turkish economy. Hence, via VAR
analysis, we obtain an expected outlook i.e. a reference point to evaluate model
responses. This subsection ends with the interpretation of the VAR responses.
In Chapter 6, responses of model experiments under traditional and augmented
Taylor rule are reported and responses of model experiments and VAR responses will
be interpreted. Finally, at the conclusion chapter, key findings will be discussed after
a very brief summary of the study.
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CHAPTER 2
INFLATION TARGETING FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, an overview of the inflation targeting regime will be made. In
this context, first section evaluates the formation, strengths and weaknesses of the
framework and in Section 2.2, the role of international capital flows and exchange
rates will be examined.
2.1 Overview
Although, there are many different definitions which vary in detail for what really
inflation targeting is, unanimity exists on the main characteristics of this monetary
policy regime. Initially, it is considered as a framework rather than a rule, where
the main objective is the price stability, but the instruments, horizon and the form
of the target is freely determined by the central banks. Due to the increases in oil
prices during 1970s, a global trend of soaring inflation began. Since attempts to di-
minish inflation remained inadequate, expectations also became sticky at high levels
which made it even harder to fight with. Taking their lessons from the destructive
effects of this stagflation period, academics and policy makers began to emphasize
the importance of sustaining price stability.
Earlier monetary policy regimes such as targeting exchange rate or monetary
aggregates happened to fail or remain inadequate to perform this task. Fixed ex-
change rate regime was extremely fragile to international capital flows and vulner-
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able against speculative attacks. Thus, system was prone to discrete breakdowns
which may precede further financial and/or banking crises. Moreover, monetary
policy was not flexible enough to respond domestic or external shocks; since the
interest rates depend on the circumstances of the country the currency is pegged.
Regime has interpreted as a surrender of monetary independence by Frankel (1999).
On the other hand, the success of money growth targeting was directly linked
to the relationship between money growth rate and inflation. However, empirical
studies like Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and country experiences that practiced
this regime showed that connection between the two is too unstable and unreliable.
Moreover, rapid development of financial instruments made it even more difficult to
define the quantitative variables and made this method even more ineffective. Ac-
cording to many economists (for example, Epstein and Yeldan, 2008), given the
background of monetary policy regimes, it was natural to target inflation directly.
Hence, on the contrary of Bretton Woods system, IT framework was adopted in an
evolutionary manner.
In order to define a monetary regime as inflation targeting, it should satisfy a
number of properties. Initially, relevant institutions primary task should be price sta-
bility. Other macroeconomic considerations should also be taken into account, but to
the extent to their compatibility with this primary objective. Another characteristic
is the public announcement of numerical target for the medium term inflation. The
declaration shouldnt only consist of expectation or forecast of inflation, but also, it
should contain an institutional commitment to realize the announced target. Central
banks are bounded with the accountability principle in case of a failure to hit the tar-
get. The degree of enforcement differs from publishing a statement that explains the
reasons for the failure and propose measures to be taken (Turkey) to the deposition
of head of Central Bank (New Zealand) according to country.
The role of independence is also crucial in IT regime. Central Banks should be
7
given the freedom in its operation and choice of policy instruments to hit the target.
Any assignment that conflict with the price stability, such as financing government
budget deficits via printing money or lending credit would violate the success of the
regime.
Transparency is another key feature of IT framework. Central banks all forecasts,
strategies and behaviors should be traceable by public via speeches, articles, reports
and web sites. To decide policy instrument and its path, inflation targeters should not
consider monetary aggregates only but should also utilize a very broad information
set including developments in exchange rates, aggregate demand and supply, mon-
etary indicators, government budget, pricing behaviors, productivity, employment,
balance of payment and most importantly expectations.
The essence of IT is to anchor inflationary expectations. If Central Bank manages
to convince public that it would adjust interest rate in case of temporary deviations
from output or inflation, to ensure target would be hit at the end of the planned
horizon, expectations would be kept low and it would be unnecessary to alter the
policy rate at all. Hence, we can say that IT is a preemptive measure rather than
a cure in the fight of inflation. According to Loayza and Soto (2001), existence of
the threat makes its practical application unnecessary. So, in order for this regime to
be successful, public confidence should be developed by ensuring some perquisite
conditions such as commitment, independence, accountability and transparency of
Central Bank and existence of strong financial markets. Since, it is hard to provide
such an environment immediately, many countries like Turkey preferred to practice
implicit inflation targeting to create the desired preconditions. Adoption of IT before
preparing the underlying foundations may lead to loss of credibility and diminish the
probability of success.
At this point, we should review the credibility and flexibility concepts before
proceeding. According to Svensson (2000), a Central Bank is flexible to the extent
8
it can also stabilize output and/or factors other than inflation. And credibility can
be defined as the proximity of targeted inflation to private sector expectations. In
the first glance, it may seem that, there exists a trade-off between the two. Making
inflation targeting credible typically diminishes the authorities’ short-term flexibility
and constrain policy discretion. However, in the medium or long run, if Central Bank
manages to acquire enough credibility, it would also become more and more flexible
to respond other macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, commitment to hit to target
overcomes the time-inconsistency problem.
Inflation targeting proved to be the best monetary policy regime used in fight
with inflation. Collaboration with public enables to control expectations, pricing
behavior and stabilization can be reached with no or little effort. Since, one of the
hardest issues while dealing with inflation is to pull down the expectations once they
became sticky at high levels; IT tries to prevent them to form at the high levels in
the first place. Moreover, by averting high expected inflation, the inevitable lags that
originate from the time required for the policy will be effective are diminished and
economy will avoid from the costs of inflation in the disinflation period.
IT presents a midway for the long debated discretion versus rules problem. Ac-
cording to Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), it may be called as constrained discretion
where it specifies certain targets for monetary policy, define responsibilities, and es-
tablish measures of transparency and accountability. However, it left the choice of
policy instrument and the method to hit the target to the Central Banks (Loayza and
Soto, 2001). In the case where CB succeeded in implementing credibility, flexibility
would also be accomplished and best features of both approaches would be obtained.
Owing to these benefits, from its first adaption by New Zeland at 1990, inflation
targeting regime praised by most economist and began to be adopted by increasingly
more countries. The ever-increasing number of adoptions and the fact that only three
9
countries1 abandoned the regime show that countries do not have a better alternative
at the moment.
Many studies support the public opinion of IT is a successful regime in bringing
down the inflation. Corbo, Landerretche and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) have conducted
an empirical study in which they compare the performances of inflation targeting
countries with two different control groups: potential targeters and non-targeters.
They found that, inflation targeters were able to hit their target and their sacrifice
ratios were lower than both of the control groups. Based on country VAR analyses,
inflation forecast errors also reduced among inflation targeters after adoption. More-
over, variance decomposition results indicate that response of inflation and output
gaps to price and output shocks are stronger than control groups (Corbo, Lander-
retche and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002). Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) found that
inflation targeting is very effective in anchoring long run inflation expectations and
diminishing inflation persistence by comparing medium term and long term inflation
expectations using Consensus Economics surveys of market forecasters. Gu¨rkaynak,
Levin, and Swanson (2006) supports their findings of inflation targeting does anchor
long run- private sector inflation expectations by comparing the behavior of daily
bond yield data in the United States, the United Kingdom. For the critics of re-
maining blind to changes in real activity in favor of protecting inflation, Roger and
Stone (2005) showed that in practice, IT is very flexible. Petursson (2004) showed
that according to the sample of inflation targeters that have more than 10 years of IT
experience, inflation fell from %9 to 3, 5% after adoption. The results were similar
when the study repeated with industrial countries. In this case, decline in inflation
was from 5% to 2, 5%.
From theoretical perspectives, Gali (2002) showed that for Central Banks to sta-
bilize the output and inflation there should be a credible threat to vary interest rate
1Finland, Spain and Slovakia left IT to accept Euro as currency.
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sufficiently in response to deviations from target. However, if the central bank is
credible enough, there may not be a need to implement the policy since the threat is
already effective to shape expectations. Ravenna (2007) found that, inflation volatil-
ity had decreased significantly under inflation targeting by obtaining historical shock
series from his estimate of a DSGE model. Majority of this decline has been found
to originate from the changes in expectations.
Besides its benefits, IT has also its flaws. And ironically, its main strength of
focusing inflation may also become its main weakness as well. Although, the main
focus is inflation, its driving sources havent been considered sufficiently. Thinking
from the perspective of a small country, in the case of an adverse supply shock due
to increased energy prices, Central Bank can keep the inflation low by raising the
interest rates sufficiently. However, this move would have no impact on huge global
forces. So, it wouldnt solve the overall problem. Moreover, effects of the decrease in
output level and increase in unemployment level could be much more harmful than
the effects of the raise in the inflation. Some developed countries such as United
States exclude food and energy prices from their measurement of inflation. However,
especially for developing countries, this is not applicable, since this would exclude
more than 50% of their prices determination.
Another important flaw of the inflation targeting framework is the threat of zero
lower bound and liquidity trap. In a deflationary economy, in case of a recession that
requires an expansionary policy, authorities may not be able to push the already low
interest rates further. Since placement of open market operation bonds at negative
nominal interest rates is impossible, economy may catch into a liquidity trap. Japan
economy during 1990s is a good example for such a case. In theoretical grounds,
this situation is characterized by an unstable equilibrium. Some suggested remedies
such as increasing the inflation target and others (for example,Loayza andSoto,2001)
claim that as long as sum of inflation target and long run average real interest rate
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exceed a certain level of threshold (generally 5%), liquidity trap can be avoided.
Moreover, even interest rates become useless as a tool, exchange rate channel will
still work as a monetary policy stabilizer. However, effectiveness of these remedies
is controversial and Japan experience still terrorizes policy makers.
Historical high inflation periods created a misperception that as long as inflation
is low and growth rates are satisfactory, economy is healthy. It is thought that, as long
as inflation level is low, if there are signals indicating a possible depression, Central
Banks can supply money, inject liquidity to the system and stimulate demand. Of
course, no Central Bank in the world is willing to ignore developments in the real
economy such as growth and unemployment. However, along with the fear of losing
credibility, within the unique objective framework Central Banks job is the price
stability. Indeed, Mitchell and Anthea (2004) showed that after Australia adopted IT,
it managed to bring down and stabilize the inflation but for the expense of huge rises
in unemployment. Some economist claim that monetary policy focused initially on
inflation (can be thought of origins of inflation targeting) increased unemployment,
especially in European countries, over the 1990s.
Another common critique for inflation targeting framework is that, success of the
regime for bringing down the inflation and improving macroeconomic performance
is only coincidental since the timing of the transition to IT and the duration within
it has practiced have relatively favorable conditions and lack of supply shocks. This
problem also made it harder to make a proper comparison. Although, some claim
that global economy experience shocks also during IT regime like oil crises in 90s
and East Asian crisis, other claim they are relatively regional shocks and exemplify
the failure of IT by indicating its performance during latest global financial crisis.
There were signs for the approaching crisis, however they were hard to detect
and respond with traditional monetary policy tools. Heavy financialization, illogical
leverages, soaring asset prices, global imbalances, huge increase in debt based con-
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sumption were all indicating something was wrong with the economy, but monetary
policy was blinded until the effects were felt at inflation and output. Some (for ex-
ample, Stiglitz, 2010) even claimed that monetary policy contributed to prepare the
necessary conditions for the crisis.
Now, almost all economists agreed that financial markets are a crucial part of the
economy and for all decisions concerning economy; they should also be taken into
account. Considering the interaction between the two, this is especially essential for
conduction of the monetary policy. How could this be done and to what extent is a
new and fruitful research area. It is impossible to find a global measure for financial
stability since the definition and indicators of it differs significantly from country to
country. Hence, difficulties in identifying asset bubbles and finding eligible indica-
tors to measure the health of financial sector are only a few of the obstacles for this
task. Without a doubt preventing the emergence of unsustainable developments in
money and credit would be a great contribution for sustaining price stability.
In the end, we can say that, inflation targeting framework has some indisputable
benefits and some of the concepts it bring along such as transparency, interaction
with public and expectation management will continue to be essentials in conduc-
tion of monetary policy. But although price stability is the necessary condition for
macroeconomic stability, it is not sufficient at all. Some revisions and adjustments
are required for the prevailing monetary policy throughout the world to avoid from
the crises become more and more frequent and oppressive or at least minimize the
losses. One area needs revision is obviously the role of financial sector. But there
is one more branch that should be considered: the role of exchange rate in inflation
targeting framework which will be discussed in detail next section.
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2.2 The Role of International Capital Flows and Exchange Rates
As it is discussed in Section 2.1, after the outbreak of the global financial crisis,
most economists agree that there exist deficiencies in the inflation targeting frame-
work. Most of the studies (for example, Woodford, 2012; Aydn and Volkan, 2011;
Takatoshi, 2010) focused on the consideration of financial stability in the monetary
policy. This measure is surely reasonable especially, for developed countries where
the financial markets are rooted, sophisticated and significantly effective for macroe-
conomic stability. However, little attention has been paid to emerging countries
where, there exist some other factors beside financial instability for the origination
of the domestic crises. These countries have relatively less developed financial sec-
tor (in this case absence of mortgage market and exotic financial derivatives) and/or
better financial monitoring and regulation system due to their earlier financial cri-
sis experiences. Hence, in their case, triggering factor for domestic crises were not
country specific financial instabilities, but fragilities originated by decrease in cap-
ital inflows or even sudden stops by which they finance their high current account
deficits, and inability to respond exchange rate fluctuations. These observations re-
vitalized the discussion about the role of exchange rates and capital flows in the
monetary policy and inflation targeting regime.
Capital inflows may be particularly risky factor for countries that have large cur-
rent account deficits like Turkey. It leads to an increase in external credit volume and
appreciation in local currencies which widen the deficit in current account balances
further. For developing countries, financing growth and current account deficit via
capital inflows is not an extra ordinary scenario, since it is hard to obtain entire suffi-
cient resources domestically. However, type of the capital inflow should be the focus
of attention here. Attracting FDI is the most beneficial type of foreign investment for
the home country, owing to its permanence and ability to create employment oppor-
tunity. As inflows get more and more volatile, home country will become more and
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more sensitive to the shifts in global market sentiments. Depending on hot money
to finance growth and current account deficit may result unexpectedly higher growth
rates when global trends are favorable. However, when uncertainties emerge due to a
crisis or doubts arise even due to just speculation, home countries face deep domestic
crisis. Furthermore, when the deficit in the current accounts become extremely high,
doubts about the sustainability would also contribute to formation of pessimistic
expectations. Hence, we can conclude that developing countries that finance their
growth and current account deficits in this manner are bounded to experience fluc-
tuations in their output and macroeconomic well being that originate from external
shocks and shifts in global market sentiments.
Moreover, intensive capital inflows have an indirect impact on the rise of infla-
tion. These inflows may lead asset bubbles and extension of credit beyond control
which, in turn increase inflation. Moreover, policy makers may become obliged to
adjust their policy decisions for not to be a subject of sudden stops. Balances become
more complex, if the domestic interests like stimulating economy when there is a re-
cession, conflict with the aim to convince investors to stay in the country with higher
returns. Overvaluation of the currency and endearing the returns may deteriorate
external balances and threaten the financial and macroeconomic stability.
After the 2007 crisis, one thing is certain. Controlling the excessive fluctuations
in international capital flows is a must for the health of the economy. Capital account
restrictions are one of the proposed measures for the control of exaggerated interna-
tional capital flows. However, these restrictions may fail to differentiate desirable
investment and unfavorable hot money and impede economies access to interna-
tional capital markets in the long run by generating negative sentiments for possible
investors. Additionally, this kind of restrictions could be administratively costly and
difficult to manage. Overall, financial development may suffer considerably.
Central Banks and international institutions concentrated on new measures that
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could be taken to decelerate and canalize capital flows. Most authorities once pas-
sionately defending free capital movement recognized its threats after global finan-
cial crisis. IMF economists proposed two new Tobin tax like devices. Financial
stability contribution which is a supplementary tax that will be imposed on banking
activities at a constant rate and financial transaction tax which will be an interna-
tional implementation where the tax rate will be freely determined by home coun-
tries. Central Bank of Republic of Turkey also started to emphasize its possible risks
on financial and macroeconomic stability. CBRT declared at 2010 Inflation Report
that it will monitor the capital flows closely and will use the monetary policy devices
including required reserve ratio and liquidity management to limit associated risks.
Exchange rate, the other factor we are investigating, is a key economic variable
which is effective on inflation, exports, imports and economic activity. Previously,
it had been used as the main tool for controlling inflation and/or as an implicit taxa-
tion tool to control export sectors.2 The discussion about the role of exchange rates
in inflation targeting framework is not as ancient as inflation targeting itself, since
the first inflation targeters are industrial countries, for whom, exchange rate is not
an overwhelming concern. However, after the consecutive crashes of exchange rate
pegs during late 1990s and early 2000s, many emerging countries adopted inflation
targeting and moved to flexible exchange rates. Problems started to arise and discus-
sion about the role of exchange rate in this framework began at those times.
Especially for inflation targeters, exchange rates most direct effect is on inflation.
It may affect inflation through the prices of traded final goods and imported inter-
mediate goods, and through their impact on inflationary expectations. Hence, the
higher the share of traded goods and imported intermediate goods in consumption
basket, the higher the country is prone to inflationary pressures from abroad. Devel-
oping countries are more dependent to import of intermediate goods, especially, if
2Argentina used deliberately overvalued exchange rates to control agriculture exports.
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there are no or few domestic substitutes. Thus, depreciation in exchange rates lead to
increase in cost of production, prices and inflation. Hence relationship between ex-
change rates and prices are stronger in developing countries compared to developed
countries.
Another channel, through which exchange rates are effective is global compet-
itiveness. Uncertain environment due to exchange rate fluctuations may endanger
trade relations and external balances. Attraction of foreign direct investment would
considerably fall. Moreover, the movement among major currencies may force pol-
icy makers to give symmetric reactions with other emerging market economies and
diminish independence in policy conduction.
From financial stability perspective, a real appreciation and related large capital
inflows may trigger credit expansion and lead asset bubbles and investment boom.
Due to the overextension of domestic financial system, economy becomes more frag-
ile to a slowdown and/or decreases in capital inflows. Finally, the collapse of the
asset prices lead to the outbreak of the crisis. Furthermore, in case of a decline in
exchange rates, solvency of firms and individuals would receive a blow which may
lead bank runs if it becomes widespread. Hence, combining with the decline in asset
prices and credit quality, financial problems could be transferred into real sector via
credit channel as in East Asia and Latin crises.
In light of the consequences of problems due to exchange rate fluctuations, we
can see that fear of floating is not an irrational concern. Furthermore, according to
Ho and McCauley (2003), emerging countries like Turkey are more vulnerable to and
less protective against exchange rate shocks than industrial countries for historical
and industrial reasons. Hence, consideration of exchange rates in monetary policy
help strengthening these vulnerabilities and shocks will become less destructive i.e.
macroeconomic balances become less fragile. Conventional role of exchange rate in
inflation targeting framework is to let exchange rates to be determined in the markets
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freely and not to intervene as long as it has a direct effect on inflation or output.
However, waiting for the indirect impact on inflation or output induce more and
more vulnerabilities in a cumulative manner. Furthermore, response for the shock
will come with a considerable lag and delay the recovery.
It is clear that remaining ignorant to exchange rates would result in problems
that would heal in long run. However, how to respond to exchange rates and to
what extent are still controversial discussion topics. One way to dampen exchange
rate volatility and to slow or reverse currency movements in the inflation targeting
framework is the foreign exchange interventions. Official intervention in the foreign
exchange market means that the central bank or other agents of the government buy
or sell foreign currency in an attempt to influence the exchange rate value. Purchases
of foreign exchange usually are intended to push down the home currency value
of the exchange rate, and sales usually are intended to push it up. Central banks
may also engage in sterilized foreign exchange interventions where their purchase
or sale of foreign exchange is offset by selling or purchasing domestic securities
so as to keep the domestic interest rate at its target. Although its effectiveness is
controversial, it is known that many governments engage in this practice.
Most advocators of IT recommend incorporating exchange in the policy rules
(i.e. Taylor rules). Also, empirical studies show that Central banks tend to con-
sider exchange rate while conducting monetary policy. Taylor (2001) proposed the
following monetary policy rule which incorporates real exchange rates:
it = fpit +gyt +h0et +h1et−1 (1)
Here, i is the short term interest rate,pi is the deviation of the rate of inflation from
its target level, y is the deviation of real GDP from potential real GDP (often called
the output gap), and et is the log of the real exchange rate in year t. f and g are the
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traditional Taylor rule coefficients; h0 and h1 are the coefficients of the current and
lagged log of the real exchange rates in the augmented Taylor rule, and are the main
interest of this discussion. In the context of above equation, question about the role
of exchange rate in a policy rule is identical to the question of what is the numerical
value of the parameter h is. Naturally, if h0 and h1 are both equal zero, developments
in exchange rate should not be incorporated in the policy rule and augmented Taylor
rule reverts to its traditional form. And if h0 is smaller than 0 and h1 = 0, an exchange
rate that is above normal exchange rate requires lowering the policy instrument i.e.
relaxing the monetary policy. In principle, optimal monetary policy may have both
coefficients different than one.
Some argue (for example, Edwards, 2006) that if the policy makers can calculate
and incorporate the effects of exchange rate on inflation and output, there may be no
need to include exchange rate as a separate variable. On the other hand, others like
Taylor (2001) argue that even central bank could able to calculate the effects and co-
efficients correctly, policy makers may prefer preempt the effect by adjusting policy
stance when exchange rate changes occur, rather than the effect become observable
from inflation and/or output. Moreover, country specific factors such as inflation
dynamics, extent of pass-through effect or central banks loss function are crucial in
determination of ho and h1 coefficients.
However, there may be problems associated with this approach. Initially, some
strict inflation targeters may oppose the incorporations of exchange rate into the pol-
icy function since it would harm the single price stability objective and diminish
the confidence of public. Another problematic issue is the possibility of conflict
of interests i.e. a policy action that is, intended to decrease inflation may hurt the
exchange rate objective. These factors require a careful parameterization of the rel-
evant coefficients. In spite of these drawbacks and declarations of central banks that
they are considering exchange rates but not incorporating it into their policy rules
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directly, such declarations are not assuring since announcements and actions of cen-
tral banks vary frequently. Indeed, Mohanty and Klau (2005) show that eleven out
of thirteen emerging countries coefficient for real exchange rates in policy functions
proved to be significant. In chapter 7, effectiveness of incorporating exchange rates
into the monetary policy rule will be discussed theoretically by comparing responses
of traditional Taylor rule and augmented Taylor rule at a small open economy DSGE
model.
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CHAPTER 3
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
This chapter examines the global financial crisis and its impact on Turkish econ-
omy. In Section 3.1, formation, causes and consequences of the global financial
crisis will be discussed. By evaluating the origins of the crisis, deficiencies of the IT
framework will be examplified in practice. Section 3.2 studies the impacts of global
financial crisis on Turkish economy. This section is important in two ways. Firstly,
CBRT made significant modifications in its monetary policy framework after the cri-
sis. Secondly, findings derived in this part motivates the extensions in the theoretical
model.
3.1 Formation, Causes and Consequences of Global Financial
Crisis
The impacts of the deepest crisis after Great Depression have not been ceased yet.
This prolonged influence is mostly due to the ineffectiveness of traditional monetary
and fiscal policies to revitalize the economy. But the most dramatic effect is the loss
of confidence on banks, financial markets and even glorified concept of capitalism.
As it is clear now, deficiencies and flaws in the financial market had the leading role
in the freefall but one should also recognize the effects of structural defections on
the real economy. Debt based excess consumption is one of the primary problems.
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In the bottom sixty percent of the income distribution in United States, average
consumption expenditures equaled or exceeded average pre-tax income. The one
fifth of the population just above them consumed 5/6 of their income. A major pro-
portion of the private savings have generated by the top of the income pyramid. So,
saving investment mechanism which fosters capital accumulation that is essential
for economic growth, depend on keeping wages down. These facts are supported by
the statistical evidence. Real income has been stagnated for decades (except for a
small period at the end of 1990s) and even decreased after 2003. But in spite of the
falling income, consumption continued to grow, even reached the seventy percent
of the GDP. Low interest rates and financial markets in predatory lending behavior
encouraged households to borrow, in order to maintain their previous consumption
levels. This debt-based excessive consumption is not a domestic danger only. It also
creates global imbalances that threaten the health of the global economy. Current
account deficit of United States is largely financed by the excess saving in the devel-
oping countries. With China and other developing countries holding so much dollar
reserves and Treasury Bills of US government, US comforts itself with borrowing
at a low cost, and lenders feels more secure in case of a possible crisis. Right now
both parties may be satisfied with the deal. However, if lenders starts to question the
solvency of US economy or disruptive changes in exchange rates occur, the conse-
quences may be catastrophic.
Superfluous financialization process had a key role in the crisis. It can be defined
as disengagement of economy from real activities such as production and investment
and tending towards to financial markets and financial instruments. This holds both
for firms and financial institutions, especially commercial banks. The problem was
to focus on higher private returns and completely ignore the social causes. Making
more and more profits owing to productivity increases, fewer and fewer profitable
investment opportunities became available to firms. In order not to lose their sur-
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plus value, they preferred purchasing financial assets with high returns. Although
they managed to maintain (raise) their excess surplus, capital accumulation process
essential for economic growth was hindered. Since executives were paid by stock
options, they do whatever they can do (including creative accounting to show the
company good on the short run) and enjoy the rise in the stock prices. Due to this
shortsighted behavior, firms long run performance negatively affected.
On the other side, banks forgot their crucial role in economy of providing nec-
essary funding to small and middle sized entrepreneurs which are the basis of job
creation. They abandoned the role of intermediation between borrowers and savers
and began involving in the transactions directly by preferring securities to loans as
assets. Besides dampening the investment, production and growth, this structure had
a substantial impact in creating bigger and bigger bubbles that burst more frequently
with more devastating effects.
Another fundamental problem is the persistent existence of asset bubbles. Ex-
cess liquidity which took its source from low interest rates creates asset bubbles.
Since 1970s, a bubble has replaced by another in the US economy. According to
Kindleberg (2000), basic pattern of speculative bubbles includes five stages: a novel
offering, credit expansion, speculative mania, distress and crash/panic. I will char-
acterize recent real estate bubble in this context. A novel offering may be a new
market, revolutionary new technology, an innovative product, etc. In this case, it was
the newly invented mortgage based tropic securities. With securitization, mortgages
bundled in such a way that subprime mortgages with high risks at great quantity
combined with low risk assets in minimum amounts to ensure AAA rating. Rating
agencies had already revealed their incompetence at East Asia crisis by giving high
rates to the assets from countries on the verge of a cliff. Furthermore, the private and
social returns were not matched since they were paid by the very companies they
were rating.
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Although securitization spread the risk, it also break link between borrowers and
lenders. Lenders trusted banks to check the affordability of mortgages and banks
trusted to mortgage firms. But mismatch of social and private incentives appeared
again. Mortgage firms were paid with the quantity of the mortgages they sold. So to
obtain more profit, they ignore the quality. Another example of misguided intentions
was the invention of tropic mortgage products. While some countries succeeded
in creating secure mortgages with low fees, financial engineers deliberately created
complex products to minimize regulation and competition and charged high trans-
action fees to maximize profits. These new products were also flawed in the sense
that, they were based on two ungrounded assumptions: the housing prices will not
decrease and house prices in different states are not correlated. Of course, the lack
of regulation did not originated by the complexity of these products alone. FED
rejected the proposal of government about the authority augmentation for regula-
tion purposes. Also, lobbying activities processed by financial markets have bigger
responsibility in this failure. Without necessary regulation, banks did not act as in-
termediaries only and directly involved in process by holding these risky mortgage
backed securities as assets.
In the second stage, a credit expansion is required to feed the asset price bubble.
After a process of continuous increase in technology stock prices, between March
2000 and October 2002, stocks witnessed 78% decline. With the burst of the bubble,
government tried to cure the corresponding recession with tax cuts and further de-
creases in interest rates. However, the economy was yet experiencing excess capacity
and the low interest rates and changes in reserve requirements did not stimulate more
investment in plant and equipment. The extraordinarily low interest rates and dimin-
ished requirement for down payments combined with the longer mortgages which
eased the financing and made it affordable for anyone even at soaring prices. In-
creasing number of mortgages, especially subprime mortgages consequently boosted
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mortgage based securities (MBS). Furthermore, repeal of Glass-Steagall Act which
had separated the investment banking and commercial banking at 1999, enabled birth
of too big to fail banks and encourage moral hazard. Relying on the deposit insur-
ance and knowing they will not be allowed to fail, banks engaged in excessive risk
taking more and more. The number of subprime mortgages issued and imbedded in
MBS doubled twice from 2000 to 2005.
According to Foster and Magdoff (2009), speculative mania is characterized by
rapid increase in quantity of debt and an equally rapid decrease in its quality. House-
holds considered the increasing prices as driving motive rather than the income
streams it would generate and depend on excessive borrowing for financing. Not
only mortgage lenders and borrowers involved in the soaring bubble. Real estate
speculators also engaged in the purchase of houses to sell them at a higher price
in the future. For many homeowners, the largest asset in their portfolio was their
houses. So to maintain their consumption under declining real income, they with-
draw cash value from their homes depending on the low interest rates. At the top of
the bubble, new mortgage borrowing increased by 1.1 trillion dollars in October and
December 2005 alone.
In the fourth stage this popular asset fell into decline by an exogenous factor. The
first sign of this decline in real estate prices was detected at 2006, with the increase
in interest rates and decrease in the housing prices in some subprime regions such
as California, Arizona and Florida. These changes began to worry the borrowers
who were depending on two digit increases in housing prices and zero like interest
rates. Soon, investors recount their concerns about a possible contagion of the falling
prices in real estate to other states. In the first half of the 2007, credit a debt swap
which was designed to protect investors raised by 49% globally.
Finally, panic began when some investors couldnt resist the pressure and started
to sell off their assets. Initial crash took place when two Bear Stearns hedge funds
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imploded at July 2007, and failure and bailing out of British mortgage lender North-
ern Rock marked the crisis globally at September 2007. Financial panic diffused
rapidly throughout the world. This panic was partly due to the complexity of the
system, since nobody knew where these toxic assets were accumulated. By January
2008, it was officially accepted by newspapers and authorities that system was at
panic stage. Fed lowered interest rates from 4.75% at September to 3% at January
and announced more cuts could be expected. Federal government succored with a
150 billion dollars stimulus package.
Package was far from being enough and one fail followed the other. Loosening of
the accounting standards has enabled banks to hide their off balance sheet activities,
where toxic assets were buried. Non performing mortgages were showed as if they
were valuable assets. The failures of banks were rescued by purchase of toxic assets
by state, bailouts and nationalizations. Opponents proposed different solutions such
as giving low interest loan to mortgage owners. It seems logical since such a move
would allow borrowers to pay their debts and made them homeowners (rather than
more foreclosure of houses); this would reflect as better prices in real estate markets
which would enable banks heal their balance sheets.
Now, world is facing a trade off. One way is to let this burst bubble replaced by
another. Of course this will not be a permanent solution but a precursor of more fre-
quent and devastating crises. The other way is to reforming the economy especially
the financial markets. Recovery measures for the crisis is not within the scope of this
thesis however the most fundamental issues to be considered is discussed. House-
holds took their lesson from the recent crisis. They began saving and cut down
consumption. But because of the stimulation packages and bail outs by trillion dol-
lars, fiscal deficit reached record amounts. We can say that America switched debt
financed private spending to debt financed public spending. So excessive consump-
tion problem is not severe as before now but the inequality in the income distribution
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continues to be a major trouble since it disturbs the saving investment process further
in the case of insufficient consumption. At the moment, capital gains from specula-
tion are taxed at a lower rate than wages. A new progressive taxing system, which
gives more weight to the incomes of rich, may be a feasible solution. Arrangements
should be done to prevent encouragement of predatory lending such as Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act which allowed banks to distain a
quarter of an individuals income in case of a bankruptcy.
One of the most significant consequence of the crisis is the questioning the role
of state. Bailing out of banks is still a controversial topic for economists. But ev-
erybody agrees with the need for regulation. But, regulations should be organized
specific to industry. Finance sector that lies at the heart of the economy requires
much more care than any other sector. Strict regulation and monitoring is a must.
But taking domestic measures will not be sufficient. Capital always flows to less reg-
ulated country and because of the externalities lack of global coordination, financial
markets may be subject to fragmentation and segmentation. Furthermore, incentives
should be improved in order to avoid mismatch of private and social returns. Cri-
sis has highlighted the importance of transparency. Firms and financial institutions
should be obliged to publish their financial statements which clearly demonstrate the
real position of the institution. One of the most essential adjustments is restrictions
on excessive risk taking. More capital requirement for high risk actions, offering
high deposit insurance fees and dealing with problematic financial instruments such
as derivatives are just a few examples of such measures.
3.2 Impacts of Global Financial Crisis on Turkish Economy
In this section, impacts of the global financial crisis on Turkish economy will be
examined. This chapter is particularly important, since findings derived here will
clarify the motivations for extensions of theoretical model.
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Just before the outbreak of the crisis, Turkish economy was at the peak of the
recovery trend from the 2001 crisis. Owing to unbending monetary and fiscal dis-
cipline, single digit inflation level had been preserved and economic growth trend
began at 2002 sustained at 4.5% at 2007. These improvements on economic con-
ditions along with the optimistic expectations made Turkey an attractive emerging
market and increases in capital inflows during 2006 continued in 2007. 36.7% of
these net capital inflows (excluding IMF credits and reserve changes) were com-
posed of foreign direct investments. However, decrease in saving ratios and rapid
increases in consumption and investment of private sector mainly financed exter-
nally, which widened the current account balance further, and lead to an increase in
external debt stock.
Central Bank continued to implement explicit inflation targeting framework it be-
gan at 2006 and proceeded using flexible exchange rate regime. CBRT adopted the
philosophy of not to intervene to exchange rates unless, there exists excessive fluc-
tuations. In order to minimize effects on demand and supply conditions of market,
foreign currency auctions were made at earlier announced dates and limits.
According to Kibritc¸iog˘lu (2010), there are four main channels through which
other countries can be affected from global financial crisis. First channel is high
risk asset trade channel. In this channel, balance sheets of the international entities
that own toxic mortgage based securities are weakened due to the collapse of house
prices. Second way for contagion of the crisis is credit channel. Contraction in in-
ternational credit channels contaminate flow of funds and create problems for firms
that finance their new investment externally. Trade channel works through the con-
traction in external demand for third countries. Decline in the demand of developed
countries lead disorders in demand composition and deteriorate trade and current ac-
count balances. Final channel is through the rise in uncertainties which lead decline
in confidence to economic policies. In this chapter, impacts of the global financial
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crisis will be examined within this scope.
When we take a look at the immediate effects of the crisis, we can observe that
like many emerging countries, impact was limited. Owing to its earlier crises expe-
riences, Turkish economy had a relatively stronger financial system. After the es-
tablishment of Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, monitoring and super-
vision of banking sector became very efficient and regulations on capital adequacy
ratio and leverages ensured the strength of the sector. During 2007, banking sector
kept on growing and sector share in GDP rose. At 2008, increase in the cost of exter-
nal funds and worsening of credit opportunities reflected on the credit costs, which
builds up more than half of the assets of the banks, along with the decline in the risk
appetite leaded to decrease in speed of credit increase. 2009 brought an improve-
ment in capital structure of banks. But, in spite of the gloomy financial environment,
banking and financial sector managed to protect its strength after the European Debt
Crisis. Financial Strength Index which is an indicator of the well being of financial
sector remained high at post crisis period. Moreover, lack of deep mortgage markets
and absence of toxic mortgage based securities in the balance sheets of entities, pro-
tected Turkish economy from high risk asset channel. Hence, Turkey had much less
fragility problem via asset channel, compared to its own history and developing and
developed countries.
2008 was the year where real impacts were began to be felt. Economic growth
declined sharply especially for the developed countries. Due to the contraction in
external demand, export level decreased sharply. With the effect of the uncertain-
ties due to the global crisis, consumption decisions postponed, both domestic and
external demand contracted and trade volume declined.
It can be inferred that trade channel worked in the transmission mechanism of
crisis in Turkey. Economies of major trade partners of Turkey faced deep domestic
crisis and their external demand diminished significantly. After 2009, economic
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Figure 1: Financial Strength Index
growth which took its source from domestic demand began to accelerate. However,
economies of Turkeys major trade partners didnt improve as fast as Turkish economy.
As a consequence, domestic and external demand began to diverge. Concentration
of capital inflows leads overvaluation of Turkish Lira which deteriorated the trade
balance further. Ever growing deficit between imports and exports can be observed
from the graph above.
With the deepening of the crisis, at the last quarter of 2008, concerns raised in the
financial markets and international credit markets contracted. Accordingly, capital
flows slowed down and net exits observed at the last quarter. Weakness and insta-
bility of precursor indicators of global economy, high levels of unemployment and
inability to solve structural deficiencies in banking sector kept markets suspicious
about the sustainability and permanence of this recovery. In conjunction, capital
inflows considerably fell at 2009. With the impact of expansionary policies imple-
mented in the developed countries, global liquidity enlarged during 2010. Relatively
better economic structures and higher interest rates diverted capital flows to devel-
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Figure 2: Capital Flows and GDP
Source: CBRT
oping countries. Turkey, as well, was affected from this portfolio sourced capital
inflows that reached 16.3 billion dollar during 2010. Foreign direct investment also
increased by 3.9% and reached 7.1 billion dollars.
In the above graph, it can be observed that growth of Turkish economy is highly
dependent on the international capital flows. GDP growth and capital flow com-
pletely act in unison. These international capital flows display a fluctuating structure
and when a sudden stop or reversal of capital flows occurs due to external factors,
Turkish economy faces a sharp decline in GDP growth and domestic crisis. Con-
traction of GDP at 1994, 2001 and 2008 all coincided with the decline in the capital
flows. These observations alone indicate the importance of capital flows and credit
channel; and need for measures to strengthen the economy against changes in risk
appetites.
To sum up, after the mortgage crisis, importance of financial stability has under-
stood better and many developed and developing countries including Turkey started
to take financial stability as one of their main objectives. It is already mentioned
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that financial stability indicators are different for each country since fragilities are
not identical. For Turkey, high current account deficit, divergence between domestic
and external demand and imbalances in external financing compositions(see Figure
7.) can be named for major fragilities. In this context, CBRT concentrated on moni-
tor and control undesirable capital inflows, balancing external and domestic demand
and dampen the cyclical component of current account balances.
In order to achieve these objectives, Central Bank designated two intermediate
tools to provide transmission mechanism between two objectives: credits(see Figure
6.) and exchange rates. These are perfect variables for the task, since they can be ob-
served with no lags, can be easily monitored and directly related with final objectives.
To support the traditional monetary policy tools of traditional one week matured repo
auction interest rate, the Central Bank used overnight lending and borrowing interest
rate corridor, and required reserve ratios actively. For instance, after concentration of
short term external financing and credit enlargement started at 2010, CBRT followed
a strategy to discourage capital inflows by keeping short term interests low and by
controlling the domestic demand and credit growth by raising required reserve ratios.
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CHAPTER 4
MODEL
The model utilized in this thesis study is a discrete time infinite horizon dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, designed to explain the impacts of
recent global financial crisis on Turkish economy. In contrast to majority of expe-
riences throughout the world, influence of this crisis in Turkey has been observed
mostly on real economy rather than the financial sector (Tandırcıog˘lu, 2009). While
some economists claim the underlying reason for this case was the absence of a
rooted mortgage market in Turkey, others (for example, C¸anakc¸ı, 2009)argued that
measures taken at the 2001 crisis especially the establishment of BDDK has pro-
tected the financial sector by taking preventive measures such as repressing exces-
sive leverages. There are also many theories that attempt to explain the transmission
mechanism of the crisis in Turkey.trade channels. In Section 3.1, it is proposed
that, the transmission mechanism of the crisis to Turkish economy was via credit
and trade channels. Model that will be used is extended in order to capture these
channelss impact.
The model is a variant of M. Iacoviello (2005). The original paper places the real
estate sector to focus of attention and investigates the relationship between housing
prices, borrowing constraints and business cycles in US economy. Since in the US
economy, housing prices are a crucial factor for the health of the financial stability,
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model is very successful in capturing the real business cycle dynamics of US econ-
omy. This paper aims to examine the Turkish economy and our findings at section
3.1 indicate that Turkish economy affected from the crisis via credit and trade chan-
nels. In this context, model is extended to capture these channels along with the
exchange rate fluctuations. On the contrary of the base paper, variable of focus is
net international investment position which may be a good predictor of international
capital flows. Price of the net international investment position is taken as real ex-
change rates. There exists a preference parameter subject to exogenous shocks which
affect exchange rates and allows us to examine the change in dynamics in response
to a shock. Another contribution of this thesis study is the inclusion of imported
capital goods into the production function of the entrepreneurs. The reasoning be-
hind this inclusion is to evaluate the effects of a shock in the exchange rate to the
production as well. Imported intermediate good evolution is symmetric to domestic
capital goods evolution. Furthermore, capital adjustment functions of both capital
goods share the same functional form. Foreign capital is taken broadly to refer to
both foreign capital and imported intermediate goods. This generalization will allow
greater interpretation power considering Turkish experience.
Nominal price rigidities are included to the model in order to capture the business
cycle dynamics. The model requires five basic agents in the economy: Patient and
impatient household, entrepreneurs, retailers and the central bank. The base model
has two important features which also preserved in the extended model. Firstly,
the borrowing limit of the impatient households and entrepreneurs depend on their
net international investment position. That is, the higher their foreign asset holding
abroad (or the less their foreign liabilities), the higher they can borrow. And the
second is that, households lend in real terms but receive back in nominal terms. This
assumption is imposed since it replicates results closer to real data and also allows
us to investigate the effects of an inflation shock on borrowing, consumption and
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output.
4.1 Patient Households
Patient households consume, supply labor, demand international assets, interna-
tional currency and money. The term ”patient” indicates the assumption that a por-
tion of the households care less about current consumption thus they have lower
discount rates. They use their savings at international financial markets, buying for-
eign currencies and/or bonds. Variables with prime symbol will be used for patient
household for the rest of the paper. Patient households maximize a lifetime utility
function given by:
E0
∞
∑
0
βt(ln(c′t)+ jt ln(d
′
t)− (L′t)η/η+κ ln(M′t/Pt))
where E0 is the expectation operator, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, c′t is con-
sumption at t, d′t is the net international investment position for patient household, L′t
are the hours of household work for the enterpreneurs and M′t/Pt are money balances
divided by the price level. jt allows for random disturbances to the marginal utility of
investing/borrowing abroad, and, given that it directly affects housing demand, offers
a parsimonious way to assess the macroeconomics effects of an exogenous shock on
exchage rates. Now denoting qt = P
f
t /Pt as the exchange rate where P
f
t is the foreign
price level calculated by a foreign currency bundle, and wt =Wt/Pt as real wage. Pa-
tient households lend in real terms b′t = B′t/Pt and receive back Rt−1Bt−1/Pt where
Rt−1 is the nominal interest rate on loans between t-1 and t. Denoting ∆ as difference
operator, the flow of funds is:
c′t+qt∆d
′
t +Rt−1b
′
t−1/pit = b
′
t+w
′
tL
′
t+Ft−ξd,t+T ′t −∆M′t/Pt (1)
where ξd,t = φd(∆d′t/d′t −1)2qtd′t −1/2 denotes the international investment ad-
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justment cost which can also be thought of intermediation cost of financial institu-
tions, pit = Pt/Pt −1 is the gross inflation rate, Ft are the lump sum profits received
from the retailers, and the last two terms are net transfers from the central bank that
are financed by printing money. First order conditions for the patient household
optimization problem are below:
1
c′t
= βEt{ Rtpit+1c′t+1
} (2)
w′t = (L
′
t)
η−1c′t (3)
q′t
c′t
=
j
d′t
+Et{βqt+1c′t+1
} (4)
M′t
Pt
= βtκEt{Pt+1Rt−1} (5)
Although, first order conditions yields a money demand function, money supply
will always meet money demand at desired interest rate since our focus is the interest
rate rules. Since we have separable utility function, the quantity of money has no
implications for the rest of the model.
4.2 Impatient Households
Impatient households discount the future more heavily than patient households. Sim-
iliarly, they choose consumption, international investment position, labor and money.
Variables with double prime symbol will be used for patient household for the rest
of the paper. Impatient households maximize a lifetime utility function given by:
E0
∞
∑
0
βt(ln(c′′t )+ jt ln(d
′′
t )− (L′′t )η/η+κ ln(M′′t /Pt))
where β′′ < β. This guarantees an equilibrium in which the borrowing constraint
is binding for impatient households. Borrowing constraint is as follows:
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c′′t +qt∆d
′′
t +Rt−1b
′′
t−1/pit = b
′′
t +w
′′
t L
′′
t +T
′′
t −∆M′′t /Pt−ξd,t (6)
b′′t ≤ m′′Et(qt+1d′′t pit+1/Rt) (7)
where ξd,t = φd(∆d′′t /d′′t−1)
2qtd′′t−1/2 which is an analogous term also appears at
budget constraint of patient household. Borrowing of the impatient household is lim-
ited to a fraction of the value of the individual’s net international investment position
which may be thought as an indicator of well being of the household. In other words,
m′′ = 0 is like a limit case where household is excluded from the financial markets
since their international assets are not considered reliable enough to let them borrow.
First order conditions for the impatient household optimization problem are below:
1
c′′t
= Et{ β
′′Rt
c′′t pit+1
+λtRt} (8)
w′′t = (L
′′
t )
η−1c′′t (9)
qt
c′′t
(1+
φd∆d′′t
dt−1
) = β′′
qt+1
c′′t+1
(1+
φd4d′′t+1
d′′t
)+
jt
d′′t
+λt(m′′qt+1pit+1) (10)
M′′t
Pt
=
κ(Ptc′′t )(Pt+1c′′t+1)
(Pt+1c′′t+1)−β′′(Ptc′′t )
(11)
where, λt is the shadow value associated with the borrowing constraint. We can
see that first order conditions of the patient and impatient household differ (except
(9)) with addition of a multiplier associated with borrowing constraint.
4.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs produce intermediate good using L′t ,L′′t patient and impatient house-
hold labor, Kt and Ft are domestic and foreign capital goods respectively which de-
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preciate at rate δ and created at the end of each period. Net international investment
position is also assumed to contribute production. Production function of the inter-
mediate good is as follows:
Yt = AtKνt−1d
υ
t−1F
ζ
t−1L
′α(1−ν−υ−ζ)
t L
′′(1−α)(1−ν−υ−ζ)
t (12)
where technology At is random. There exists an analogous of international in-
vestment adjustment term, ξe,t . Furthermore, an adjustment costs of capital ξK, t and
ξF, t are included to capture real data dynamics.
ξe,t = φe(∆dt/dt−1)2qtdt−1/2
ξF,t = ψe(Mt/Ft−1−δ)2Ft−1/2δ
where Mt = Ft− (1−ρ)Ft−1 is the import of foreign capital
ξK,t = ψe(It/Kt−1−δ)2Kt−1/2δ
where It = Kt− (1−δ)Kt−1 is the flow of motion for capital.
The remainder of the problem is standard: Entrepreneurs maximize
E0
∞
∑
0
γt logct
where γ < β. subject to technology (12), borrowing constraint (7) and budget con-
straint:
Yt
Xt
+bt = ct+qt∆dt+Rt−1bt−1/pit+w′tL
′
t+w
′′
t L
′′
t +qtMt+It+ξe,t+ξK,t+ξFt (13)
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The first order conditions for the entrepreneurs are below:
1
ct
=
γRt
pit+1ct+1
+λtRtb (14)
vt =
1
ct
(
ψ
δ
(
It
Kt−1
−δ) It
Kt−1
− ψ
2δ
(
It
Kt−1
−δ)2)+ψEt µYt+1ct+1Xt+1Kt + vt+1(1−δ) (15)
where vt = ( 1ct ){1+(
ψ
δ )[(
It
Kt−1 )−δ]}
v′t =
1
ct
(
ψ
ρ
(
Mt
Ft−1
−ρ) Mt
Ft−1
− ψ
2ρ
(
Mt
Ft−1
−δ)2)+ψEt µYt+1ct+1Xt+1Ft + v
′
t+1(1−ρ) (16)
where v′t = ( 1ct ){1+(
ψ
ρ )[(
Mt
Ft−1 )−ρ]}
w′t = α(1−ν−υ)
Yt
XtL′t
(17)
w′′t = (1−α)(1−ν−υ)
Yt
XtL′′t
(18)
where (16) and (17) are labor demand schedules and (15) states that shadow
price of the capital, vt equals marginal product of capital next period plus capital
contribution to lower installation costs plus the shadow value of capital next period.
4.4 Retailers
Retailers are the source of the nominal price rigidities. They purchase intermediate
goods from entrepreneurs at Pwt in a competitive market, differentiate goods at no
cost into Yt(z) and sell at price Pt(z). The final goods production function is as
follows:
Y ft = (
∫ 1
0
Yt(z)ε−1/εdz)ε/ε−1
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correspondingly, each retailer faces the following demand curve
Yt(z) = (
Pt(z)
Pt
)−εY ft
retailers choose Pt(z) taking Pwt and above demand curve. When probability of a
producer to change prices is (1−θ), optimal P∗t solves
∞
∑
0
θkEt{Λt,k(P
∗
t (z)
Pt+k
− X
Xt+k
)Y ∗t+k(z)}= 0 (18)
where Xt =
Pwt
Pt
is the mark-up and Λt,k = βk( ctct+k ) the first order condition with re-
spect to P∗t (z)
∂(.)
∂P∗t (z)
= 0→ P∗t (z) = (
Xt+k
X
1
Yt+kε
1−ε
Pt+k (∗)
Thus, P∗t (z) equates expected discounted marginal utility and expected marginal
cost (discounted). Profits, Ft = (1− 1Xt )Yt are finally rebated to patient households.
Aggregate price level is:
Pt = (θP1−εt−1 +(1−θ)(P∗t )1−ε)1/1−ε (∗∗)
where the first term represents the fraction of retailers who do not change prices and
the latter represent the fraction who change the prices at period t. Combining (*)
and (**) and linearising yields a forward looking Phillips Curve which states that
inflation depends on pie positively and Xt negatively.
4.5 Central Bank
Central Bank makes lump-sum transfers of money to the real sector to implement
a Taylor- type interest rate rule. To evaluate whether incorporating exchange rates
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into the Taylor rule makes a difference along with the traditional Taylor rule, an
augmented Taylor that incorporates exchange rates is constructed.Responses under
both Taylor rules will be reported and compared at the next chapter.
Traditional Taylor rule:
Rt = (Rt−1)rR(pi1+rpit−1 (
Yt−1
Y
ry
)r¯r)1−rReR,t (19)
where r¯r is the steady state real rate and Y is the steady state real output. Hence,
monetary policy responds systematically to past inflation and past output. We prefer
backward looking rule to the forward looking rule since data favors this one. If rR> 0
the rule allows for interest rate inertia. And eR,t is a white noise shock process with
zero mean and variance σ2ε
Following Svensson (1999, 2000), both current and one period lagged exchange
rates were added into the augmented Taylor rule.
Rt = (Rt−1)rR(pi1+rpit−1 (
Yt−1
Y
ry
)r¯r)1−rR−rq1−rq2q
rq1
t q
rq2
t−1eR,t (20)
4.6 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is an allocation {ht ,d′t ,d′′t ,L′t ,L′′t ,Yt ,ct ,c′t ,c′′t ,bt ,b′t ,b′′t ,Kt}∞t=0 together
with the sequence of values {w′t ,w′′t ,Rt ,Pt ,P∗t ,Xt ,λt ,λ′t ,qt}∞t=0 satisfying (1)-(15),
market clearing conditions, sequence of shocks and transversality conditions.
(1) 1c′t = βEt{
Rt
pit+1c′t+1
}
(2) 1c′′t = βEt{
Rt
pit+1c′′t+1
+λtRt}
(3) w′t = (L′t)η−1c′t
(4) w′′t = (L′′t )η−1c′′t
(5) qtc′t =
j
d′t
+Et{βqt+1c′t+1 }
(6) qtc′′t =
j
d′′t
+Et{βqt+1c′′t+1 +λt{m
′′qt+1pit+1}}
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(7) Yt = AtK
µ
t−1d
ν
t−1L
′α(1−µ−ν)
t L′′(1−α)(1−µ−ν)t
(8) YtXt +bt = ct+qt∆ht+
Rt−1bt−1
pit +w
′
tL
′
t+w
′′
t L
′′
t + It+ξe,t+ξK,t
where Xt = PtPwt
(9) 1ct = Et{
γRt
pit+1ct+1}+λtRt
(10) vt = 1ct (
ψ
δ (
It
Kt−1 −δ)
It
Kt−1 −
ψ
2δ(
It
Kt−1 −δ)2)+ γEt{
µYt+1
ct+1Xt+1Kt
+ vt+1(1−δ)}
where vt = 1ct (1+
ψ
δ (
It
Kt−1 )
−δ)
(11) w′t = α(1−µ−ν) YtXtL′t
(12) w′′t = (1−α)(1−µ−ν) YtXtL′′t
(13) bt = mEt{qt+1htpit+1Rt }
(14) ∑∞t=0θkEt{Λt,k(P
∗
t (z)
Pt+k
− XXt+k )Y ∗t+k(z)}= 0
(15) Pt = (θP1−εt−1 +(1−θ)(P∗t )1−ε)1/1−ε
Market Clearing Conditions
(1) Lt = L′t+L′′t
(2) dt = d′t +d′′t
(3) Yt = ct+ c′t+ c′′t + It
(4) bt+b′t+b′′t = 0
given {ht−1,Rt−1,bt−1,Pt−1}
and shocks {eR,t ,epi,t ,e j,t ,eA,t} and following transversality conditions :
limt→∞βtuc,tmt = 0
limt→∞βtuc,tkt = 0
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CHAPTER 5
VAR ANALYSIS
In this chapter, reaction of Turkish economy to the shocks to monetary policy,
inflation, technology and exchange rates (through preferences) will be examined. At
the first glimpse, it may seem confusing to use both empirical and theoretical models.
But by conducting an empirical analysis, the aim is to measure the success of the
fitting of the model i.e. tests whether the theoretical model constructed for post-crisis
Turkish economy provide realistic dynamics compared to the data. Furthermore, we
will have the opportunity to compare the responses at different equilibriums.
For this purpose, a vector auto regression analysis is constructed based on pol-
icy interest rate, real GDP, inflation and exchange rates. Exchange rate is the key
variable in the analysis since aim is to answer whether responding exchange rates
makes a difference in business cycle fluctuations. In this sense, output and inflation
are also inevitable to measure the volatility of business cycle in IT framework. Fi-
nally, importance of interest rate in the theoretical model and IT framework make
it necessary to incorporate interest rate in the analysis. Furthermore, these variables
maximize the compatibility with the theoretical model since in the model; shocks
are given to the system via technology (output), preferences (exchange rates), mone-
tary policy (interest rates) and inflation. A constant and a time trend was also added
as exogenous variables. For the output values, the log of real GDP was detrended
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with Hodrick-Prescott filter. Change in the log of consumer price index was used for
inflation data and exchange rates were sampled from real effective exchange rates
based on CPI.
The analysis is based on monthly data covering the time period January 2003
to March 2012. There are two reasons to make such a selection. First is to use an
overlapping sample as the one used in the calibration of the model. Also, during
this period, inflation targeting framework was actively being used by Central Bank
of Republic of Turkey (implicit and explicit). All data is obtained from CBRT and
TURKSTAT.
The unit root tests are undertaken to evaluate the time series properties of the
selected variables. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test reports that nominal ex-
change rate and CPI are non-stationary in levels and first distances, but stationary in
second differences, suggesting that they are integrated of order 2, I(2). Output and
interest rates are first difference stationary variables, I(1). Although, differencing the
data even if they contain a unit root is a controversial subject, this thesis adopts the
strategy of differencing. Hence, all variables enter the model in second differences.
Model can be expressed as follows:
Yt = β0 +β1Xt−1 +β2Xt−2 + εt
where Yt =

rt
pit
qt
yt

, Xt−1 =

rt−1
pit−1
qt−1
yt−1

, Xt−2 =

rt−2
pit−2
qt−2
yt−2

, εt =

εr,t
εpi,t
εq,t
εy,t

,
β0 =

β1,0
β2,0
β3,0
β4,0

, β1 =

β1,1 β1,3 β1,5 β1,7
β2,1 β2,3 β2,5 β2,7
β3,1 β3,3 β3,5 β3,7
β4,1 β4,3 β4,5 β4,7

, and β2 =

β1,2 β1,4 β1,6 β1,8
β2,2 β2,4 β2,6 β2,8
β3,2 β3,4 β3,6 β3,8
β4,2 β4,4 β4,6 β4,8

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And system of equations is :
(1)rt = β1,0 + β1,1rt−1 + β1,2rt−2 + β1,3pit−1 + β1,4pit−2 + β1,5qt−1 + β1,6qt−2 +
β1,7yt−1 +β1,8yt−2 + εr,t
(2)pit = β2,0 +β2,1rt−1 +β2,2rt−2 +β2,3pit−1 +β2,4pit−2 +β2,5qt−1 +β2,6qt−2 +
β2,7yt−1 +β2,8yt−2 + εpi,t
(3)qt = β3,0 +β3,1rt−1 +β3,2rt−2 +β3,3pit−1 +β3,4pit−2 +β3,5qt−1 +β3,6qt−2 +
β3,7yt−1 +β3,8yt−2 + εq,t
(4)yt = β4,0 + β4,1rt−1 + β4,2rt−2 + β4,3pit−1 + β4,4pit−2 + β4,5qt−1 + β4,6qt−2 +
β4,7yt−1 +β4,8yt−2 + εy,t
Identification of the shocks of such model is achieved by applying Cholesky de-
composition. Cholesky decomposition imposes restrictions which is necessary to
identify the structural VAR model that links the reduced form and the structural
residuals. Economically, these restrictions imply that some of the structural shocks
do not have a contemporaneous impact on some of the variables. Therefore, eco-
nomic interpretation is obtained through the ordering of the variables, as it specifies
which shocks are not allowed to contemporaneously affect which variables. In line
with the earlier studies, Cholesky ordering in this study is: policy rate, inflation,
exchange rates and output respectively. However, later simulations with different or-
derings did not alter the results significantly. Furthermore, system found to be stable
since all inverse roots of polynomial function are within unit circle(see Figure 8).
At the above table, impulse response functions of the VAR analysis can be ob-
served. After a shock to monetary policy, interest rates raise immediately around
10 basis points. Inflation also responds with an immediate one base point increase.
Exchange rates rises gradually and respond of output is negative. All variables ex-
cept interest rates (1.5 years) normalize around a year (first column). To a shock to
inflation, exchange rates positive respond is weak, on the contrary to outputs weak
negative respond. All responds are normalized after six months (second column).
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses of VAR Analysis
Responds to exchange rate are all weak except its own. Interest rate and inflation
moved together where outputs sudden decrease followed by a gradual raise and then
normalized. Excluding exchange rates, all other variables normalize less than a year
(third column). Finally, in respond to a technology shock, interest rates and exchange
rates move positively with around 3 months lag and inflation respond negatively. Im-
pacts of the technology shock are relatively long termed (fourth column).
In summary, in light of this analysis, one may expect:
• A positive response of inflation and exchange rate, and a negative response of
output in case of a monetary tightening.
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• A small negative response of output and a slight positive response of exchange
rates to a positive inflation disturbance.
• A positive co movement of inflation, exchange rates and output with some lags
to a preference shock that affects exchange rates.
• And a negative response of inflation and exchange rates to output shocks.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
In this section, VAR responses and model responses under a traditional Taylor
rule and an augmented Taylor rule that incorporates exchange rates will be compared.
In the traditional Taylor rule, greater importance is given to the stabilization of output
to approximate the monetary policy responses of post crisis Turkish economy.
Into the augmented Taylor rule, both current and one period lagged exchange rate
are added. Following Svensson (1999, 2000), coefficients are selected as -0.37 and
0.17 for the current periods and previous periods exchange rates, respectively. Svens-
son run a series of simulation exercises and suggested that these values are optimal.
Although, optimality is dependent on the model specification and parameterization,
they may serve as a good starting point for this study.
At the above tables, model responses under two Taylor rules can be found. First
columns show a monetary tightening. As expected, responses are very similar under
both Taylor rules with a shock to monetary policy. One difference is that inflation
stabilizes sooner at the model with augmented Taylor rule. Models differ from the
VAR with the immediate decreases in pi and q. Both responses approximate the VAR
after their fifth period. On the other hand, model and VAR varied significantly for
output responses. Both models deliver strong negative reactions where VAR reports
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses of Model with Traditional Taylor Rule
slight positive response and gradual decline until normalization.
Considering the shock to inflation case, one could observe that the two mod-
els only differ slightly in the sense that normalization is sooner at the model with
augmented Taylor rule. Impacts of the shock to the inflation do not die out at the
VAR, on the contrary to the models in which normalization occurs approximately 6
months later. This may be interpreted with the rise of the inflationary expectations
and becoming sticky at high levels. Combining with the inflation history of Turkey,
this may be a plausible explanation for the difference. Response of the output is well
approximated but model failed to capture the impact on exchange rates.
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Model with Augmented Taylor Rule
Responses of models to a productivity shock are very similar excluding the re-
sponse of exchange rates. Under traditional Taylor rule set-up, after shock hits, a
strong negative response is observed after a sharp recovery, followed by a decline
began around third month and another recovery period began after fifth month. In
other words, response of exchange rate is volatile. But at the model with augmented
Taylor rule, the response is pretty smooth. When the results of VAR and the models
are compared, matching can be observed for only output responses. Neither the im-
mediate declines in interest rate, nor the sharp increase in inflation can be observed
in the VAR responses. Moreover, positive response of exchange rates comes with a
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lag of 4 months at VAR, where the response is immediate at models.
The most dramatic effect of including exchange rates in Taylor rule can be ob-
served at the responses to a preference shock that influence exchange rates. In the
traditional model, response of interest rate is very strong and permanent where in
the model with augmented Taylor rule, after the initial impact of a decline, interest
rate normalizes in 1,5 years. Response of exchange rates are very similar and only
magnitude differs at the responses of output. VAR results approximate responses of
interest rate but with a lag. Response of inflation at the model with augmented Tay-
lor rule do not match with VAR well, which may be a consequence of ignorance of
exchange rates in the policy rule. Relative similarity between traditional model and
VAR may be a supportive finding for this interpretation. Finally, response of output
is underestimated in the model.
In general, the model responses mostly differ from the VAR responses in the case
of a shock to productivity. A possible reason for this may be the fact that, it is harder
to take VAR shock as a productivity shock since a tax or government spending shock
could be observationally equivalent. For this reason, comparison between VAR and
model is harder in this case. Responses of VAR and model to a shock to monetary
policy and inflation match quite well. But interestingly, at the model there exists
common sudden declines immediately after the shock. After approximately five
periods, these sudden declines come to the levels to VAR responses initial levels.
Another point to note is that, model responses are less in magnitude i.e. model
is successful in minimizing output and inflation fluctuations. Especially, after an
inflation shock, at VAR, inflation does not return to its initial returns, however with
the model both response is much smaller and normalization occur less than half a
year. The hardest issue is to evaluate a shock to exchange rates. Exchange rates own
response is similar but smaller in magnitude where the outputs response is larger
in magnitude. Although, VAR response of inflation is very limited, model delivers
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positive response of inflation which is in line with the theory.
On the other hand, along with reducing volatility, incorporating exchange rates
into the monetary policy create a tradeoff between inflation and output in some cases.
To a shock to monetary policy and inflation, there are obvious gains in stabilization
of inflation however, that may require an output gap sacrifice. On the contrary, in the
case of an exchange rate shock, output gains and inflation convergence to the target
tradeoff exists.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, impacts of global financial crisis on IT framework are examined. De-
ficiencies of the framework are discussed and some extensions are proposed. After
the global financial crisis, one of the most criticized concepts was IT framework, for
remaining blinded to building up of vulnerabilities and could not respond to instabil-
ities in financial sector. However, finding a universal formula for ensuring financial
stability is not an easy task since, for every country, financial stability indicators differ
significantly. Furthermore, for developing countries, financial channels work through
international capital flows and exchange rates.
This study aims to propose a model for post crisis Turkish economy, where trade
and credit channels are more effective compared to financial channels. In this context,
to clarify the motivation of the study, first an overview of the inflation targeting is made
with an emphasis on the role of financial stability, international capital flows and ex-
change rates. Discussion of global financial crisis and its impact on Turkish economy
helps to motivate the extensions of the model.
To answer the question whether responding to exchange rates makes a difference
in dampening the business cycle fluctuations; a small open economy DSGE model is
constructed. Base model is extended to capture Turkish economys dynamics. According
to the finding that Turkish economy mostly affected from the global financial crisis via
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credit and trade channels, net international investment position and imported capital
goods are incorporated to the model. Additionally, a VAR analysis is performed to
measure the fitting and success of the model quantitatively. Although, it may seem
the combination of two different methodologies, wed like to measure the success of the
theoretical model empirically. Within this scope, responses of VAR analysis and models
with traditional and augmented Taylor rules are compared.
Main contribution of this thesis is the construction of the model that allows exchange
rate fluctuations. Ability to capture the trade channel and credit channel are key features.
Finally, addition of exchange rates into the Taylor rule in this model allows comparison
with traditional Taylor rule in this set up.
According to the model responses, model with the augmented Taylor rule approx-
imates the Turkish economy dynamics better. Furthermore, model with the augmented
Taylor rule helps to smooth business cycle fluctuations compared to traditional Taylor
rule and VAR responses. However, in case of a shock to inflation and monetary policy,
gains from volatility in inflation may require a sacrifice in output gap and on the con-
trary, in case of a shock to exchange rates, there exists a tradeoff between gains from
output gap and higher inflation.
In conclusion, global financial crisis made it clear that IT framework should be re-
vised and extended to avoid potential threats from financial sector, international capital
flows and exchange rates. Global financial crisis also indicated that, a universal cure is
impossible since fragilities of each country are different. This thesis focuses on coun-
tries that suffer from high current account deficits and vulnerable against sudden stops
and contraction in external demand through fluctuations in exchange rates like Turkey
or more generally emerging economies.
With the extensions, model is able to capture the dynamics of Turkish economy
pretty good. We can generalize that it can be used for developing economies that are
affected from global crisis via trade and credit channels rather than developed countries
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that are affected by financial channels. Model responses indicate that overall, incorpo-
rating exchange rates into the Taylor rule helps to dampen the business cycle fluctua-
tions. But in above mentioned circumstances, Central Bank should clarify its priorities
between output gap and inflation volatility since there exist a tradeoff between them.
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APPENDIX A
The Complete Log-Linearized Model
Aggregate Demand
Goods market clearing
(A1) Yˆt = cY cˆt +
c′
Y cˆ
′t + c
′′
Y cˆ
′′t + IY Iˆt
Euler equation for patient household
(A2) cˆ′t = Et{cˆ′t+1}− r̂rt
Investment schedule
(A3) Iˆt−Kˆt−1 = γ(Et{Iˆt+1}−Kˆt)+ 1−γ(1−δ)ψ (Et{Yˆt+1−Xˆt+1}−Kˆt)+ 1ψ(cˆt−Et{cˆt+1})
Net international investment position/consumption margin
Entrepreneur’s optimality condition for net international investment position/consumption
(A4) qˆt = γeEt{qˆt+1}+(1−γe)(Et{Yˆt+1−Xˆt+1}− dˆt)−mβr̂rt−(1−mβ)Et{∆cˆt+1}−
φe(∆dˆt− γdˆt+1)
Impatient household’s optimality condition for net international investment position/consumption
(A5) qˆt = γdEt{qˆt+1}+(1− γd)( jˆt − hˆ′′t )−m′′βrˆrt +(1−m′′β)(cˆ′′t −ωEt{cˆ′′t+1})−
φd(∆dˆ′′t −β′′Et{∆dˆ′′t+1})
where ω= (β′′−m′′β′′)/(1−m′′β), γh = β′′+m′′(β−β′′)
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Patient household’s demand incorporating market clearing
(A6) qˆt = βEt{qˆt+1}+(1−β) jˆt+ ιhˆt+ ι′′hˆ′′t + cˆ′t−βEt{cˆ′t+1}+ φdd′ (d∆dˆt+d′′∆dˆ′′t −
Et{βd∆dˆt+1 −βd′′∆dˆ′′t+1})
where ι= (1−β)d/d′, ι′′ = (1−β)h′′/h′xz
Borrowing constraints
Borrowing constraint for entrepreneurs
(A7) bˆt = Et{qˆt+1}+ dˆt− r̂rt
Borrowing constraint for impatient households
(A8) bˆ′′t = Et{qˆt+1}+ dˆ′′t − r̂rt
where r̂rt = Rˆt−Et{pˆit+1}
Aggregate Supply
Production function combined with market clearing
(A9) hatYt = f racηη− (1−ν−υ)(Aˆt+νdˆt−1+µKˆt−1)− 1−ν−µη−(1−ν−µ)(Xˆt+αcˆ′t+(1−
α)cˆ′′t )
Phillips Curve
(A10) pˆit = βEt{pˆit+1}−κXˆt + uˆt
Flows of funds/evolution of state variables
Law of motion for capital
(A11) Kˆt = δIˆt +(1−δ)Kˆt−1
Net worth dynamics for entrepreneurs
(A12) bY bˆt =
c
Y cˆt +
qd
Y ∆dˆt +
I
Y Iˆt +
Rb
Y (Rˆt−1 + bˆt−1− pˆit)− (1− s′− s′′)(Yˆt− Xˆt)
Net worth dynamics for impatient households
(A13) b
′′
Y bˆ
′′
t =
c′′
Y cˆ
′′
t +
qd′′
Y ∆dˆ
′′
t +
Rb′′
Y (Rˆt−1 + bˆ
′′
t−1− pˆit)− s′′(Yˆt− Xˆt)
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Monetary policy rule and shock processes
Traditional Taylor rule
(A14) Rˆt = (1− rR)(1+ rpi)pˆit−1 + rY (1− rR)Yˆt−1 + rRRˆt−1 + eˆR,t
Augmented Taylor rule
(A15) Rˆt = (1− rR− rq1− rq2)(1 + rpi)pˆit−1 + rY (1− rR)Yˆt−1 + rRRˆt−1 + rq1qˆt +
rq2qˆt−1 + eˆR,t
Stochastic AR(1) process for preferences
(S1) jˆt = ρ jˆt−1 + eˆ j,t
Stochastic AR(1) process for inflation
(S2) uˆt = ρuuˆt−1 + eˆu,t
Stochastic AR(1) process for technology
(S3) Aˆt = ρAAˆt−1 + AˆA,t
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APPENDIX B
Figures and Tables
Figure 6: Total Loan Growth Rates
(13 weeks moving average, annual fx adjusted, percent)
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Figure 7: Main Sources of Current Account Deficit Finance
12-months cumulative, billion USD
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Figure 8: Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
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Figure 9: Combined Impulse Responses
65
Table 1: VAR Estimates
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